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The Hindu Right and the Politics of Censorship: Three Case Studies of Policing Hindi 
Cinema (1992-2002) 
In the 1990s Hindi cinema was firmly entrenched in the contentious sphere of the 
political. India’s Censor Board of Film Certification (or the Censor Board as referred to 
henceforth), historically considered a primary regulatory mechanism of Hindi cinema and the 
custodian of public morality by both the citizenry and the State, found itself at the centre of a 
maelstrom of moral panics, escalating Hindu right-wing 1 protest politics, primarily under the 
aegis of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the extremist right-wing party the Shiv Sena, 
and repeated State interventions. I argue that the 1990s was marked by a gradual alignment of 
the right-wing nationalist agenda with the historically existing regulatory concerns of the 
State over the deleterious “effects” of cinema on vulnerable audiences resulting in an 
unprecedented “censor-wave” (Brinda Bose xxxix). Exemplifying this temporal alignment, 
each of the three case studies discussed here, including Khalnayak [The Villain (1993)], 
Bombay (1995) and War and Peace (2002), represents the censorship of a ‘sensitive’ issue 
for the Indian State -- sex, religion and national security -- in a prevailing climate of 
reactionary right-wing politics, anxieties over cultural invasion by globalising forces and 
unstable coalition governments. It is my contention that censorship as a selective process was 
an intrinsic principle of Hindu nationalist discourse predicated on a series of exclusions in 
terms of religion, gender, class, caste that led to the narrow remapping of the national 
imaginary resulting in the “miniaturisation” of the nation (Sen 46). 
The first case study, of Khalnayak, reveals how female sexuality was considered a 
threat to traditional Indian culture and Indian womanhood by the patriarchal alliance of the 
State, Hindu nationalist discourse and the viewing public, resulting in moral panics and the 
demand for stringent obscenity regulations. The protracted censorship controversy 
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surrounding Bombay, the second case study, foregrounds the State’s anxieties about the 
cinematic medium engendering Hindu-Muslim communal tensions prompting pre-emptive 
measures, the extra-constitutional power of Bal Thackeray, the leader of the Shiv Sena, and 
the direct involvement of the police as censor and arbiter. The third case study, of the 
documentary War and Peace, exemplifies the overlapping power relations between the Hindu 
Right and the BJP-led State. It represents the nadir of partisan political interventions under 
the pretext of safeguarding law and order and the attempted stifling of pluralistic voices in a 
shrinking public sphere.  
Through these three vignettes of landmark censorship controversies, “which reveal 
how deeply political the whole exercise has become in post-colonial India” (Pendakur, Indian 
Popular Cinema 79), I attempt to map the field of power relations that existed among the 
Censor Board and the State, the Hindu Right, the viewing public and various interest groups 
at a historical conjuncture and to locate various competing yet hierarchical, shifting and 
diffused sites of political pressure and influence in the public sphere. As Lee Grieveson 
suggests, such “a struggle over culture and cultural space is, indeed, virtually a defining 
feature of democratic societies, which almost inevitably involve a complex negotiation 
between public authority and the dissemination of facts, ideas, and representations in public” 
(“Policing Cinema” 13). In order to contextualise the persistent regulatory concerns of the 
state apparatus over “obscene, indecent and/or immoral” cinematic material a brief overview 
of the ‘media-effects’ based logic prompting direct State interventions, regulation and the 
State-instituted codes of censorship is required.  
“Why Is Film Censorship Necessary?” (“Annual Report of 1998” 1)  
According to Monika Mehta, “…censorship has been a key point of contact between the 
post-colonial Indian state, the Bombay film industry, and the Indian citizenry” (170). It is 
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interesting to note from a historical survey of cinema and censorship the astonishing fact that 
at no stage has there been any concerted action for the abolition of censorship per se, despite 
the film industry’s prolonged resentment of the Censor Board’s discriminatory policies and 
practices. A cursory look at the history of Indian cinema reveals a continuous and unequal 
battle between the Censors and the Hindi film industry. In fact “fear of the censor has caused 
producers to exercise a strict and much more insidious form of self-imposed censorship,” 
(Vasudev 204) notably through the use of visual metaphor to suggest coupling and sexual 
intimacy and the absence of the on-screen kiss theorised by Madhava Prasad in his seminal 
work, Ideology of the Hindi Film: A Historical Construction as symbolic of the “prohibition 
of the private” which Prasad contends “may well reveal some dirty secrets of the state” (92).  
He elucidates that, 
…the prohibition of kissing is a symptomatic cultural protocol whose origins lie in the 
need to prevent the dissolution of pre-capitalist patriarchal enclaves, to rein in the 
forces of democratic transformation. It is not the transparent expression of a pre-
existing cultural predilection but a ‘meaningless’ prohibition that regulates the public 
circulation of images as an obligation of the contract between new and traditional elites. 
Its tangible result in cinema (which has been the central national cultural institution 
because mass illiteracy poses obstacles to literature playing a similar role) is a blocking 
of the representation of the private. (Prasad 100) 
For Sheila J. Nayar, popular Hindi cinema’s proclivity for “happy endings” suggests “these 
resolutions are to some degree shaped by censorship codes and are therefore taken by some 
analysts to be a metaphoric if not blatantly pro-state product of government intervention…” 
(13-23).  
The necessity for some form of manifest, state-sponsored censorship stems from a deep-
rooted belief by the ruling class/elite that a powerful medium such as cinema should be 
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controlled/filtered for the consumption of the “public,” a euphemism for lumpen, volatile 
masses who must be protected from being “exposed to psychologically damaging matter” 
(“Annual Report of 1998” 1). According to the Censor Board, one of the reasons for 
justifying the state control of cinema is that “while the media…is free, regarding films it is 
considered necessary in the general interest to examine the product before it goes out to the 
public because it is an audio visual medium whose impact is far stronger than that of the 
printed word” (“Annual Report of 1998” 1). These dubious assumptions about the nature of 
audiences, audience reception and the necessity for film censorship are given credence by the 
following Supreme Court verdict 2 stated in all Censor Board Annual Reports: 
Film censorship becomes necessary because a movie motivates thought and action and 
assures a high degree of attention and retention. …It can, therefore be said that the 
movie has unique capacity to disturb and arouse feelings. It has as much potential for 
evil as it has for good. It has an equal potential to instil or cultivate violent or good 
behaviour. With these qualities and since it caters for mass audience who are generally 
not selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with other modes of 
communication. It cannot be allowed to function in a free market place as does the 
newspapers or magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable 
but also necessary. (“Annual Report of 1998” 1)  
The Supreme Court verdict is based on the oft-cited and problematic assumption that 
moving images have a direct, causal and quantifiable impact on ‘passive’ audiences. It adopts 
the “hypodermic needle model approach,” the pit-falls of which are well documented in 
media studies. Significantly, there were, and continue to be, striking similarities between the 
rhetoric of moral and regulatory anxieties about the “effect” of the cinematic medium 
expressed in 1990s India and in early twentieth century America.3 The anachronistic notion 
of the “mimetic” effect of the medium on masses or “crowds” (Grieveson “Cinema Studies”) 
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holds tremendous sway, one that continues to be invested in by the State, the elite and the 
citizenry, informing censorship codes and the differential regulatory mechanisms for the 
press and the cinema in India.  
Legal Provisions for Censorship of Hindi Cinema  
Manifest censorship is possible by the State through legal provisions that sanction direct 
interventions and regulation of cinema. These codes are firstly, The Cinematograph Act of 
1952 which repealed the 1918 Cinematograph Act; secondly, the 1994 Revision of the 1952 
Censor Board guidelines (“New Instructions For Film Censorship,”) and lastly, the Indecent 
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986, “the single most important landmark in 
the history of censorship in modern India” (Brinda Bose xxx, 101-106).4 These legal 
provisions emanate from Article 19, Clause 1 (a) of the Constitution, that guarantees to every 
citizen of India the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression (“Film Censorship: What 
Everyone Should Know” 2). However, Clause 2 of Article 19 modifies this freedom to 
“reasonable restriction” and reads as follows: 
…law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred…in the 
interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly 
relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (“Annual Report of 1998” 1)  
This is the constitutional provision adopted by the Cinematograph Act of 1952, as 
amended up to 1983. The organisational structure of the Censor Board of India and the 
guidelines for censorship are based on the provisions of this Act and the Cinematograph 
(Certification) Rules 1983. Through this Act the state exercises its stranglehold on 
filmmaking by making it obligatory for every producer to obtain the censor certificate of 
clearance before the release of the film for public exhibition. Failure to do so attracts 
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penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment, requiring even the censorship of pre-released 
film posters by the Censors (“Film Censorship: What Everyone Should Know” 12-15). 
The Cultural Policy of the BJP 
From the early 1990s there were persistent public anxieties over the moral, social, and 
political stability that historians have characterized as a “search for order” (Grieveson 
“Policing Cinema” 13) in the face of forces of globalization, coalition politics, economic 
liberalization and the arrival of foreign and privately-owned  satellite and cable television. In 
this period of flux, the insecurities of a nation were exploited to serve a nationalist agenda of 
the Hindu Right.  I shall now provide a synoptic view of the politics of the Hindu Right and 
its manifesto on media, cinema and society in order to contextualise the volatile milieu in 
which the censorship mechanism operated.  
The Hindu Right emerged as a powerful force in a relatively short period of time that 
saw the meteoric rise of its political arm, the BJP, from a fringe party with only two 
parliamentary seats in 1984 to electoral power in 1999, with 182 seats. It was the single 
largest party that led a right-wing coalition government called the National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) heralding the beginning of a five-year span of Hindu nationalist politics until 
its defeat in the May 2004 General Elections (Sen 50). The ideology of the Hindu Right is 
based on a revivalist and neo-traditionalist version of Hinduism known as Hindutva. 5 It 
created a repressive regime based on propaganda, rhetoric of anti-Muslim “hate speech” 
(Kapur WS15-WS30) and confrontational politics that disavowed the capacious, heterodox 
nature of Hinduism, undermining the nation’s secular and democratic credentials (Sen 45-
50).  
Ravi Vasudevan makes the following observation that articulates symbiotic 
representational links between the Hindutva brand of divisive politics and Indian cinema: 
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…the Hindutva movement has ideologically and physically targeted various minority 
formations, primarily the Muslims, but in the recent past Indian Christians as well…In 
complicated ways, Indian cinema has both played on and contributed to these political 
formations. (120) 
According to Sohini Ghosh, “the Hindu Right was quicker (than other political factions) to 
sense the subversive potential of popular cinema” (“Troubled Existence” 238); an astute 
observation confirmed by the BJP electoral manifesto of 1998 outlined its policy on Media, 
Cinema, Arts: 
The BJP believes that, a healthy polity and democracy cannot survive without the 
support of an extra-political moral order which the democratic political order cannot 
itself impose on its citizens…Fortunately, at the family and social levels, the age-old 
dharma,6 which is distinct from religious practice, acts as an extra-political normative 
moral order. But the normative moral order or dharma needs to be protected and 
preserved as it is already under pressure. With this end in view, the BJP will strive for a 
national consensus with the involvement of all sections of the Indian society for a 
voluntary moral standard for the media, for the media plays a very important role both in 
fostering and prejudicing such a moral order. (www.bjp.org/manifes/chap17.htm) 
Specifically on cinema the 1998 manifesto stated: 
Popular cinema has played an important role in promoting social harmony and 
nationalism, apart from providing inexpensive entertainment to the masses. However, in 
recent years, popular cinema, increasingly funded by the underworld 7, has had a 
negative impact on society, especially on impressionable young minds. Sex and violence 
on the screen is beginning to gnaw at the moorings of our cultural ethos. The BJP is 
 - 8 -
committed to checking this abuse of popular cinema. (www.bjp.org/manifes/chap17) 
[added emphases] 
I argue that in pursuit of the aforementioned voluntary moral standard for the media and the 
protection of dharma, the Hindu Right, initially under the auspices of the BJP Film Cell, 
acted both as an instigator and a catalyst for moral panics that served its reactionary cultural 
agenda of homogenisation dubbed “national consensus.”  
The exponential rise of the Hindu Right through the 1990s coincided with numerous 
attempts at cultural censorship of speech, paintings, books, magazines, advertisements, Hindi 
films and television soaps.8 Television played a crucial role in articulating and circulating 
contested nationalist imaginations on Indian/Hindu culture, the nation and national identity 
with the establishment of foreign and private channels such as Rupert Murdoch’s STAR TV 
post-1991 that ended decades of monopoly by the State channel, Doordarshan. Significantly, 
the Hindu Right had appropriated the popularity of two serials based on the Hindu epics, 
Ramayana and Mahabharata, televised on Doordarshan in the late ’80s, to mobilise its brand 
of nationalism for electoral gains as demonstrated in the seminal work by Arvind Rajagopal.9 
In Shanti Kumar’s opinion, it was “disturbing (in)… the way the BJP and its allies willingly 
perpetuate(d) this fallacious view of religion and nationalism in their electoral politics” (37). 
As Kumar observes, “…the medium of television has emerged as the new 
battleground for competing visions of nationalism, transnationalism, and translocalism in 
postcolonial India” (156). He argues, through his close readings of “transient 
transgression(s)” (182) on STAR TV’s now-defunct Nikki Tonight chat show on which 
Mahatma Gandhi was referred to as “a bastard bania” 10 by a gay rights activist in May 1995, 
that television “is the preeminent site for the expenditure of cultural excess (often 
transgressive) in India today… provid(ing) an illuminating framework for the study of 
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unimaginable communities of nationalism in the dynamic flows of electronic capitalism” 
(186). The Miss World pageant held in November 1996 in the southern Indian city of 
Bangalore provided a pretext for the BJP “to fuel the cultural anxieties of nationalism” in its 
aggressive opposition to it that “had the potential to appropriate all other forms of cultural 
criticism…in the national community” (Kumar 142). The Hinduvta concept of Indian/Hindu 
femininity and its critique of ‘decadent’ Western/‘foreign’ notions of female sexuality 
dominated the hotly-contested cultural debates that “became the symbolic condensation of 
what India had to fear most from the government’s policies of economic liberalization and 
the growing power of transnational corporations (145).11 
Thus there was a growing tendency towards cultural protectionism as a chorus of 
voices repeatedly raised objections to ‘obscenity and violence’ on foreign media channels. A 
discursive rhetoric of public 12 anxiety that repeatedly targeted women and children primarily 
focused on measures to control the corrupting influence of transnational media (Oza 1067-
1095). 1990s television was crucial for understanding how various ‘publics’ along religious 
lines were mobilized in the name of ‘Indian’ culture and the measures taken to control 
transgressive moments on television reinforced film and state-sponsored censorship.  
Case Study: Khalnayak (1993)       
In 1993, debates over ‘obscenity and vulgarity’ gathered momentum with the release 
of the controversial film Khalnayak featuring the provocative song picturisation of the 
popular Rajasthani folk song Choli ke peechey kya hai (What’s beneath the blouse?) which 
self-styled moralists believed plunged the nation into the abyss of moral turpitude. The choli 
controversy debated whether or not the song, based on innuendo and double entendre, was 
vulgar and obscene and exemplified the rhetoric adopted by the BJP and its affiliates to 
instigate and mobilise public outrage, moral panics and litigations over sexually explicit 
and/or violent films. The concern over sexual explicitness reached a fever pitch as the song 
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articulated a major representational shift concerning women that blurred the distinction 
between the ‘bad’ vamp (Westernised, sexy and promiscuous) and the ‘good’ heroine (chaste 
and virtuous) (Ghosh ‘The Troubled Existence” 238-9). This film best illustrates how the 
three major players in this drama – the censor, the filmmaker and the public - determined the 
fortune of a film.  
The Hindu Right’s attack against the song was led by the Shiv Sena in Bombay and 
the students’ wing of the BJP in Delhi. R. P Chugh, an advocate and a BJP supporter, filed a 
petition in the Delhi High Court asking for the deletion of the film song and a ban on 
audiocassette sales (Ghosh Feminists Engage With Censorship). The petition, in alleging that 
the song was ‘vulgar, against public morality and decency’ drew upon three specific 
assumptions typical of any patriarchal discourse on sexuality in India: firstly that sexuality is 
obscene; secondly, that any reference to sex amounts to denigrating women, and thirdly, that 
the entry of sexuality in public space disturbs social equilibrium (Mehta 173). After dismissal 
of the case by the trial court, the petitioners went to the High Court with the appeal that left 
unchallenged the court’s decision would be an incentive to depicting increasing vulgarity on 
screen, which in turn, would lead to increasing sexual harassment. The High Court dismissed 
the petition in a fourteen-page order on the ground that (a) film viewing was a matter of 
choice with no coercion involved; (b) that it was ‘sheer imagination’ that the song would lead 
to ‘eve-teasing,’13 and (c) the alleged vulgarity was acceptable to society in keeping with 
‘latest developments’ in the film world (Ghosh “Feminists Engage With Censorship”).  
The choli song sequence occurs twice in the film. As Ghosh points out, the allegedly 
‘indecent’ sequence is sung and performed by two women masquerading as prostitutes 
performing in a gangster’s den. This sequence gestures towards the subversive as it creates a 
space for the articulation of female sexuality momentarily in an otherwise male-dominated 
conservative film (Ghosh “The Troubled Existence” 257). The second sequence, with 
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identical lyrics and music, is sung and performed by men, culminating in the intimidation and 
physical assault of the heroine by the male protagonist. Ironically, both the petition and the 
protesters chose to ignore this sequence whilst demanding “censorship of not the sequence 
that actually depicted violence against women but one that represented sexual agency on their 
part” (Ghosh “The Troubled Existence” 239).  
Khalnayak was ultimately granted a UA certificate 14 subject to seven cuts, three of which 
pertained to the “first picturisation of the song” in Reel No. Six and read as follows: 
 Delete the words “What is beneath the blouse” from the song sequence 
 Delete the visuals of Ganga pointing at her breast in the song… 
 Delete the close visuals of pelvic jerks of dancing girls in the beginning of the song 
“What is beneath the blouse” (Mehta 178) 
In effect shots of the actress’ heaving breasts and the pelvic jerks of dancers were excised 
from the final version. Thus in its intense scrutiny of the female body, the censorship and 
obscenity codes governing Hindi cinema exemplify how the state isolates it as the prime site 
of control and regulation in the public sphere. 
The public outrage and the rhetoric of moral indignation over the unabashed, self – 
reflexive celebration of female sexuality and the female body in the song picturisation found 
expression in innumerable complaint letters to the Chairman of the Censor Board, many of 
whom were BJP members such as the President of the BJP Women’s Wing who wrote: 
Choli ke peechey kya hai is an obscene song and as a result of which new anti-social 
elements have got the excuse of singing this song on seeing girls. Many incidents of eve-
teasing have occurred. The film song singers only just to earn money are shamelessly 
singing such type of songs which are against the public interest. (Mehta 174) 
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Another BJP member observed that due to the song being sung by anti-social elements “it 
had become very difficult for girls and women to go out. In case the above song is going to 
continue, the next song would be: kachi ke peechey (behind the underwear) and peti cot ke 
peechey (behind the petticoat)…”  (175) 
Thus, recurrent opposition “over the perceived proliferation of visual sexual images under 
globalisation” (John & Niranjana 581-4) was indicative of a growing anxiety and unease 
about the emerging visibility of female bodies/sexuality and the predicaments that larger 
forces of globalisation generated. According to Brinda Bose,  
the past decade (1990s) has been enormously significant for censorship in India 
(xiv)….the BJP had a determined agenda by which it used its state machinery to 
systematically suppress what it considered ‘wrongful’ representations of sexuality 
(among other issues) in the Indian mass media. (xxxix) 
It may be said that the Khalnayak controversy triggered what Brinda Bose refers to as a 
“BJP censor-wave” of films such as Bandit Queen (1994), Kama Sutra (1996), Maachis 
(Matches, 1996), Char Adhyay (Four Chapters, 1997), Train to Pakistan (1997), Zakhm 
(Wound, 1998), Godmother (1999) and Gajagamini (2001) suggesting that “the proliferation 
of ‘cases’ involving state interventions in censoring sexual representations over the past 
decade indicates that such an avowed agenda was being relentlessly pursued” (xxxix).  
However, as the next case study reveals, it wasn’t only sexual images that provoked 
censorship as the fear of communal violence provided yet another pretext for state 
intervention. 
Case Study: Bombay (1995) 
The Censor Board’s handling of Mani Ratnam’s film Bombay would become a 
showcase of bad practice as the police, the Chief Minister and the Shiv Sena leader Bal 
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Thackeray, “the ex officio Board of Censors” (Gopalan 27) would be asked to act as proxy 
censors which would set a sinister precedent for future ‘mob’ censorship 15 as exemplified by 
Deepa Mehta’s films Fire in 1998 and Water in 2000 which was abandoned before filming 
commenced due to violence by Hindu vigilantes. 
In 1995 the pre-release tensions surrounding Bombay brought to the fore simmering 
Hindu-Muslim tensions inflamed by the demolition of the mosque, the Babri Masjid 16 in 
December 1992 by the Hindu Right. Bombay threatened to open old wounds and insecurities 
of the Muslim minority that was living in fear of a recurrence of the 1993 communal riots and 
violence in Bombay, reportedly exacerbated by Thackeray’s incendiary hate speeches and a 
communalised police force. The film, set against the backdrop of these riots, daringly 
portrayed a love story of a Hindu man and a Muslim woman. It provided sufficient fodder for 
yet another protracted censorship controversy involving the State, the police and the Shiv 
Sena, with the Censor Board caught in the interstices of this complex and nebulous power 
relation.  Lalitha Gopalan asserts that 
…as with all negotiations between the state and film producers in the 1990s, Bombay 
too had to contend with the extraordinary powers of the Hindu right in what can only be 
characterised as the slow erosion of civil society, most evident in the dismantling of the 
legitimate process of statecraft, which was superseded either by the military and state 
police forces or by vigilantes. (26) 
Fearing the release of Bombay would create law and order problems from the Shiv Sena, 
the Revising Committee of the Censor Board constituted by its chairman Shakti Samanta (a 
well-known director of Bengali and Hindi films) previewed the film along with home 
ministry and crime branch officials. According to two reports in the Indian Express, five top-
ranking police officials were deputed by the Home Ministry to decide if Bombay was fit for 
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public consumption. The Bombay city police commissioner “felt the film was not fit for 
public viewing and that its exhibition involved risk” (Noorani 240). In a clear abdication of 
the statutory power vested in the Censor Board, Samanta decided to seek the Home 
Ministry’s expert opinion as the film dealt with a sensitive issue. A hard-hitting portrayal of 
Thackeray17 was considered to be too ‘strong’ by the Censor Board despite the dialogues 
being a direct lift from his inflammatory speeches about ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bombay. A 
decision remained pending in the interim as the government took its time.  
According to Noorani, Samanta’s decision to refer to the police as proxy film censors was 
unconstitutional, contravening a 1989 Supreme Court judgement 18 that baldly asked the 
question: “What good is the protection of freedom of expression if the state does not take care 
to protect it?” thereby making it impermissible to delay, let alone refuse, certification because 
of the fear of violence. Not only did the Censor Board and the Chairman make a mockery of 
the law, they violated Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 which provides for outside 
assistance only through advisory panels thus ruling out extra-constitutional or extra-legal 
assistance. The Act confers discretion on the authorities it sets up and the Censor Board 
cannot abdicate its duties and functions in favour of others be they the police or the chief 
minister (240). According to Pendakur, “…by playing it safe bureaucratically and handing 
over its authority to the Home Ministry and the chief minister of the state, the chairman of the 
Board abdicated his responsibility to uphold the law” (Indian Popular Cinema 81). 
In a placatory telex message to the Information and Broadcasting Ministry the regional 
officer of Bombay elaborated on the six general cuts leading to a “U” certification 19 that 
included deletion of the words ‘Pakistan’, ‘Islamic state’ and ‘Afghanistan’ wherever it 
occurred; deletion of the visual of all exterior shots of Babri Masjid; the dialogue and visuals 
of the character based on Thackeray, visuals of paramilitary men firing at a crowd with white 
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cap on the ground, implying worshipping Muslims, and, the reduction of violent scenes by 
25%.20 Perusing these recommendations, Gopalan writes: 
…it is clear that the recommendations tended to protect the police from allegations of 
partiality and of excessive force, and, in effect, implied that the Muslims’ response to 
the Hindu right for demolishing Babri Masjid had been unwarranted…there is no doubt 
that the need to place blame or to understand the motivation of the riots now seems 
more arbitrary than should have been necessary in a narrative film…(26) 
To complicate matters further, “Thackeray would play a significant role in the film’s post-
production phase, demanding changes and exercising his authority as the head of the 
powerful Shiv Sena” (23). After a special screening of the film Thackeray expressed his 
displeasure on seeing his character, played by Tinnu Anand, portrayed as repenting at the 
violence caused by his party. This scene was excised in the version finally released, the 
director having submitted to pressures from Thackeray although some of his other demands 
such as removing a character, re-shooting it with another actor and changing the name to 
Mumbai were not met. Under the given circumstances, this was a feat since, as Gopalan 
remarks, “Thackeray is accustomed to having his demands heeded and his every whim 
entertained. Given his expanding dominion, it is surprising that Ratnam managed to retain the 
title Bombay” (28). 
Submitted for a routine certification on 25 December 1994, Bombay had to clear ten 
different levels of committee before the Board of Censors passed a ruling and was finally 
released in Bombay on 15 April 1995 (Gopalan 24, 32). However, despite complying with 
the cuts ordered by the Censor Board and negotiating with Thackeray the director received 
death threats and in July 1995 he survived an attempt on his life when his house was bombed 
(Pendakur “Censorship” 26). Pendakur observes,  
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these incidents prove that no matter how many cuts or compromises, the film would be 
opposed by someone or the other and that the role of the state should be to protect free 
expression and not to second guess how the viewers would respond or which political 
party would oppose the film. (“Censorship” 26) 
Notably during this period increasing calls for the outright banning of films reached a 
fever pitch. Such rhetoric called for further governmental policing of cinema. Muslims 
groups viewed the film as “anti-Islamic,” objecting to certain scenes allegedly 
misrepresenting the religion, and called for the government to first censor, then ban the film. 
Dissatisfied by the state’s response which they feared was partisan towards the Hindus, 
Muslim leaders ultimately called for the boycott of Bombay (Gopalan 29-32). 
Thus, Bombay was ravaged by various competing authorities attempting to re-inscribe 
itself in its production and reception, a text so excessively worked over and compromised that 
it resulted in half truths, historical inaccuracies and distortions, a “disingenuous even-
handedness” (Gopalan 36) in locating responsibility for the violence of 1993 and “a gaping 
hole in the representational regime of the film that conveniently exculpate(d) the police” 
(Gopalan 35). 
The case study provides evidence of the growing politicisation of the censorship 
process through the 1990s. According to Times of India, “the past decade (1988-1998) has 
been the decade of intolerant censorship by governments held to ransom by lumpen 
elements…the lumpensation of Indian democracy has been crowned by censorship by 
lumpens…successive governments (having) succumbed to mob pressure” (Dhavan). Frequent 
recourse to manifest and ‘mob’ censorship revealed the political anxiety of the Hindu Right 
to influence public opinion whilst attempting to stifle oppositional discourses. “Underlin(ing) 
how aggressive responses to cinema (were) becoming a routine occurrence,” in a strongly-
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worded Times of India article entitled, “Cinema pays the price when government gives in to 
fringe elements,” author and academic, Vrinda Nabar opined, “extra-constitutional 
interference is becoming a way of life, and violence is increasingly seen as a legitimate way 
to address issues…whether it is the cinema...(or) anything that is state controlled” (Sekhar 
and Shedde). 
Case Study: War and Peace (2002) 
During the BJP governance from 1999 to mid-2004 the Censor Board unleashed a 
repressive regime of indiscriminate excision and expurgation of films that included 
documentary cinema. The extreme politicization of the censorship process is best illustrated 
by the treatment meted out to Anand Patwardhan, India’s most famous documentary 
filmmaker and well-known for his “courageous, cinematically challenging films about key 
socio-political issues” (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 174), who had been embroiled in a 
lengthy legal battle over War and Peace (2002), a film that was openly critical of the Hindu 
Right’s jingoistic politics.  
At this point I should mention that by including a discussion of War and Peace, I am 
positioning documentary films alongside commercial Hindi films whilst acutely aware that 
the circuit of distribution and exhibition for documentary films is very different when 
compared to popular Hindi films. It is important to emphasise that the history of documentary 
filmmaking in India has a separate trajectory and the ‘public’ for documentary films such as 
War and Peace is imagined (both by filmmakers and state institutions) very differently.21 
Documentary films have been historically invested with notions of “truth” and “realism” by 
both the state and Indian audiences. Associations with veracity would often justify more 
stringent censorship of documentary and non-fiction films by the state compared with the 
fictional mode of representation of popular Hindi cinema, famous for its dream/fantasy 
sequences and song and dance picturisations.  
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Filmed over a period of three years following the 1998 nuclear tests in India, War and 
Peace is a three-hour long documentary that explores the rise of Indian jingoism, militarism 
and the globalisation of the arms trade. It begins with the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi 
and follows the rise of fundamentalism and the spread of nationalist propaganda. The 
portrayal of the glaring sense of misplaced patriotism instigated by politicians is striking 
(Katakam “A Battle Won”).  
The struggle with the Censor Board began when the Examining Committee (two out 
of the four committee members being functionaries of the ruling BJP) recommended six 
deletions which the director refused to accept. On presenting the film to the Revising 
Committee, then headed by a former BJP legislator from Gujarat, the deletions were 
increased to twenty-one cuts, which on appealing to the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal 
(FCAT) were reduced to two cuts with one addition to be made. The director petitioned the 
High Court to remove all interventions. Meanwhile in an unprecedented move by the Censor 
Board, it petitioned the High Court to overrule FCAT’s directives and re-impose all the 
twenty-one cuts (Katakam “A Battle Won”). According to the filmmaker, the cuts demanded 
by the Censor Board reflected a partisan attitude, driven by a political agenda that took 
exception to the mildest criticism of the BJP.  
The legal wrangle finally came to an end after one and a half years when the Mumbai 
High Court ordered its release without any cuts or changes since the Censor Board was 
forced to withdraw a petition that turned out to be baseless. According to the filmmaker, the 
judges had asked the Censor Board if they had ever in their history appealed against the 
orders of their own higher authority. When the response was negative the judges then 
inquired as to what special interest the Censor Board had in the matter of War and Peace that 
had prompted them to challenge the order of the FCAT. Since no coherent reply was 
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forthcoming, the Censor Board at the suggestion of the judges withdrew its petition 
challenging the order of the FCAT  (www.patwardhan.com/writings/press/042403.htm).  
The High Court’s verdict, mentioned on Patwardhan’s website, is significant as it 
underscores attempts by the Censor Board to infringe upon freedom of speech and expression 
and to compromise democratic aspirations of the nation. It reads thus: 
It is quite possible that the persons in authority today may feel that what they see is the 
only correct facet of it though it may not be so. It is only in a democratic form of 
government that the citizens have the right to express themselves fully and fearlessly as 
to what is their view point… Freedom of speech and expression is important not merely 
for the consequences that ensue in the absence thereof but since the negation of it runs 
as an anti-thesis to basic human values, instincts and creativity. It is high time that the 
persons in authority realize the significance of freedom of speech and expression rather 
than make and allow such attempts to stifle it. 
(www.patwardhan.com/writings/press/042403.htm) 
  The Censor Board had objected to several scenes that allegedly violated its 
guidelines and if screened would create a law-and-order problem. The cuts were a blatant 
revelation of the political power that manipulated the Censor Board and therefore warrant 
closer analysis. Sample cuts were made available to the public in a press release by the 
filmmaker in 2002 where he mentioned how he discovered that two of the four members 
of the Examining Committee were functionaries of the ruling party (Patwardhan “21 
Cuts”). Cut One demanded the deletion of the visuals of Mahatma Gandhi being shot by 
his killer who was a member of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), another right-wing 
Hindu party whose ideology is shared by the BJP. Cut Two was made on the grounds of 
violence -- the filmmaker is quick to point out that “a visit to any Bollywood film will 
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prove how lax Censor Board (sic) is about gratuitous violence in the entertainment driven 
commercial cinema” (Patwardhan “21 Cuts”).  
The Censor Board have repeatedly overlooked the violence in so-called patriotic 
films such as the 2001 jingoistic film Gadar: Ek Prem Katha (Mutiny: A Love Story) or 
the 2003 LOC (Line of Control), a film on Indian soldiers fighting during the Indo-
Pakistan war at Kargil. However, quite perversely, the Censor Board tried its level best to 
prevent a documentary on peace and communal harmony from being screened justifying 
its concerns on the grounds of law and order. It is ironic that “nuclear weapons (were) 
believed to prevent war and a film on peace (was) seen as a potential instigator of 
violence” (Joseph “Censoring peace amid nuclear ‘deterrence’”). 
Cuts Five, Eight, Seventeen and Eighteen were all deletions of references to the 
BJP. Cut Nine was a Dalit (low caste) song about the killing of Gandhi by a Brahmin. Cut 
Sixteen asked for the deletions of visuals of the President of India, who is coincidentally a 
scientist responsible for India’s nuclear development, whilst Cut Twenty one, probably the 
most shocking in a list of undemocratic cuts, was a general cut asking for the deletion of 
all visuals and dialogues of all political leaders including the then-President, Prime 
Minister and Ministers (Nanda "Censorship and Indian Cinema”). 
In February 2005 War and Peace won the National Award awarded by the same 
President responsible for the nuclear bomb and whose visuals had been at the centre of 
controversy. It is important to note here that the BJP-led NDA government had lost the 
general elections in May 2004, much to the shock of pollsters and political pundits alike. 
The case study thus illustrates the vulnerability of Indian cinema to State pressures and the 
distortions that can take place when decisions are based on biased political considerations.  
As Shammi Nanda asserts, “It was a clear case of the Censor Board acting as an institution 
of the State to direct public discourse and to safeguard its interests” since “War and Peace 
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was critical of India’s nuclear bomb which had been projected by the State as a major 
national achievement…” (“Censorship and Indian Cinema”). 
However, it is also important to recognize ongoing efforts, such as the “Campaign 
Against Censorship” launched by a coalition of three hundred documentary filmmakers in 
August 2003 (www.freedomfilmsindia.org/aboutus.asp), that have been successful, 
particularly in recent times with the decline of the right-wing, in mobilizing public opinion 
against a repressive state censorship regime. Since hegemony is always contested and 
unstable it is of significance to note that the state’s attempts to re-inscribe itself in the process 
of meaning production and reception have not been total and all-powerful.  
Censorship and Cultural Nationalism 
Writing in 2002, Ashish Rajadhyaksha suggests that “the BJP’s own investment into 
the concept of a ‘cultural nationalism’ (took) the lead in resuscitating the concept of nation 
from the very real threats that the State face(d) as an institution of legitimation, particularly 
following its policy of widespread disinvestment in a range of functions” (“The 
Bollywoodisation of the Indian Cinema” 102). Was censorship in the 1990s then a political 
instrument wielded to assert the supremacy of State power and governance since it was being 
challenged by a convergence of external forces such as economic liberalization and foreign 
capital investment, globalization and the ‘invasion’ of foreign satellite television? And 
following from Rajadhyaksha’s illuminating work, how can one situate the question of 
censorship now that the state has reworked its relationship to the film industry post-1998? In 
the present context, censorship is more relaxed with the proliferation of sexy item numbers 
and a new trend of erotic films exploring female sexuality in Hindi cinema (as well as in 
other regional cinemas such as Tamil and Telegu) such as Jism (2003), Khwahish (Desire, 
2003) and Murder (2004), with scantily-clad Indian actresses such as Bipasha Basu and 
Mallika Sherawat, making Choli Ke Peeche seem quite tame in comparison (N.K. Deoshi 
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“Bollywood: Sex out of the Closet in 2003”). And communal violence has appeared 
subsequently in Hindi films to some powerful effect such as in Dev (2004), with its strong 
implications of just who is fanning the communalist flames. How can one account for this 
unexpected liberal turn from roughly 2003 onwards? 
I would like to propose, by way of a possible answer, that censorship was a 
fundamental principle of Hindu cultural nationalism which was in gradual decline, post-
Godhra riots 22 in 2002. Through the ’90s, with the ascendance of the Hindu Right, the Indian 
nation was re-imagined as Hindu. I argue that this re-invention of the national imaginary 
through the lens of a militarized Hindu nationalism was based on the broad conceptualisation 
of censorship as a process of selection of one hegemonic discourse over another. Censorship 
could thus be understood not only at the cinematic level of cutting and excision but also as a 
way of reading Hindu nationalist discourse that was predicated on a series of exclusions. This 
was achieved through the process of censoring the other from the national imagination -- the 
other often donning various garbs of the Muslim, the sexual female subject, the poor, the 
rural, the lower caste and even the West according to the Right’s political and cultural 
agenda. As Peter van der Veer points out, “Nationalism is a selective, homogenizing 
discourse that tends to demarcate social boundaries sharply and to narrow down the diversity 
and ambiguity of everyday life (105).” This imaginative remapping of India as Hindustan or 
the land of Hindus led to, what the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen in his book The 
Argumentative Indian refers to as, the “miniaturisation” of the nation that was based on a 
“belligerently sectarian interpretation of Hinduism,” severely undermining India’s capacious, 
heterodox past, its celebration of plurality and tolerance (46). 
 
 
 
 - 23 -
 
 
NOTES 
                                               
1 The Hindu Right is a nationalist, right wing political movement devoted to creating a Hindu 
state in India. It includes the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (the political arm of the Right 
which was in power from 1999-2004 and was defeated by the Congress in the 2004 General 
Elections), the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) (the main ideological component of the Right) 
and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). Other parties include the extremist, anti-Muslim 
regional party Shiv Sena. These organisations collectively promote the ideology of Hindutva 
-- an ideology that seeks to establish a Hindu state in India. There are several offshoots and 
newer segments of the Hindu Right, which include the Bajrang Dal (BJD) and women’s 
wings of the main and subsidiary bodies. Together they are the Sangh Parivar or the United 
Family.  
2 This Supreme Court judgement was dated 30-3-1989 in Civil Appeals Nos. 13667-68 of 
1988 relating to the censorship of the film “Ore Ore Gramathile” (Tamil). 
3 The underlying logic of the censorship codes reveal that Lee Grieveson’s observations on 
the regulatory concerns about early cinema in America are applicable to the Indian context: 
the belief that suggestion by way of the moving image would provoke imitative acts of a 
sexual and/or criminal nature. Since the masses are considered by the State, the elite, and the 
educated to be impetuous and anti-social, incapable of self-governance and unable to 
maintain specular distance, cinema, particularly Hindi cinema due to its immense popularity 
with the “masses”, has to be placed in the hands of the State to be controlled by stringent 
censorship regulations. See Grieveson, Policing Cinema. 
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4 For a detailed account of this Act and its implications on gender, see Section 3 of Brinda 
Bose, Gender & Censorship, 99-192. 
5 Hindutva literally translates as “Hinduness,” coined by V.D. Savarkar, denoting nationalist, 
revivalist, chauvinistic Hinduism that forms the basis of Hindu right-wing ideology and the 
movement for a Hindu nation. 
6 Dharma is a basic tenet of Hinduism meaning a moral and ethical standard of conduct, 
duties and obligations or the right way of living through which Hindus could achieve 
salvation or ‘nirvana’ and escape the cycle of re-birth and reincarnation. 
7 Underworld mafia links to the Hindi film business is supposedly the worst kept secret in 
Bombay. There are widely varying accounts of the degree to which films are funded by 
illegal, black money from mafia dons and gangs operating outside the country often from the 
Middle East. This murky film-mafia nexus comes to the fore whenever there are killings, 
shootings and/or attempts on the lives of prominent film personalities, directors, producers 
etc. There have been many legal trials in the recent past that have been dismissed due to 
inconclusive, insufficient evidence -- often witnesses turning hostile due to death threats and 
fear of reprisal by the mafia. See Pendakur (2003) Indian Popular Cinema and Arjun 
Appadurai (2000) “Spectral Housing and Urban Cleansing: Notes on Millennial Mumbai.” 
Public Culture 12(3). 
8 In January 1997 the youth wing of the VHP, the Bajrang Dal attacked an exhibition by the 
prominent Indian artist M. F. Hussain for having painted goddess Saraswati in the ‘nude’. 
The controversies surrounding Salman Rushdie’s book, The Moor’s Last Sigh and Arundhati 
Roy’s Booker Prize winning novel The God of Small Things illustrate how the Right defined 
and controlled the terms of the debate. The former fell foul of the Right as a central character 
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resembled the Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray; the latter book for having an explicit love-
making scene between a woman and a lower class man. Magazine covers became 
increasingly contentious: the most famous example was ‘the Anjali Kapur controversy’ after 
an interview with the aforementioned female lawyer who had posed in legal robes and ‘semi-
nude’ for the cover of Fantasy was published in the November 1994 issue of the reputed 
India Today magazine. She was accused by the Delhi Bar Association of “professional 
misconduct” and was threatened with having her license revoked. In May 1997 the cover of 
Stardust, the national film magazine, featuring a morphed nude photograph of a famous 
actress Pooja Bhatt caused moral panic. In August 1995 controversy broke out around an 
advert for Tuff shoes depicting two nude models, lovers in real life, wearing the running 
shoes whilst embracing each other with a snake wrapped around their bodies. Charges under 
the Indecent Representation of Women’s Act, 1986 were filed against the models leading to 
the subsequent withdrawal of the ad.   
9 For a detailed account of the role of the Ramayana serial as a key BJP electoral strategy in 
fuelling Hindu nationalism in the Indian public sphere see Arvind Rajagopal’s Politics After 
Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2001. 
10 Bania is a pejorative Hindi word for a Hindu trading community originating in the western 
state of Gujarat. 
11 For an in-depth and engaging analysis of both these cultural controversies articulating 
competing national(ist) imaginations see “‘Gandhi Meet Pepsi’: Nationalism and Electronic 
Capitalism in Indian Television” and “Nikki Tonight, Gandhi Today: Television, 
Glocalization, and National Identity” in Shanti Kumar’s Gandhi Meets Primetime. 
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12 ‘Public’ in the sense that concern was expressed in the name of Indian tradition, public 
morality and the nation. 
13 In India “eve teasing” is a euphemism for sexual harassment or molestation of women. 
 
14 According to the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) website on film 
classification, the “UA” certificate is defined as “Unrestricted Public Exhibition - But With 
Parental Guidance.”   
15 By ‘mob’ censorship I refer to instances when a film is forced to be withdrawn from public 
screenings after being cleared by the Censor Board due to the violence caused by a few fringe 
elements, usually right-wing that create law and order problems, as in the case of Fire which 
was released, quite significantly, without any cuts by the Censor Board. The State, usually the 
Home Ministry, succumbs to such strong-arm tactics by being forced to recall and reconsider 
censoring the already released film. In the case of Water, this was pre-empted as the film was 
forced to be abandoned before a single shot had been taken due to mob violence. 500 
supporters of Sangh Parivar, the alliance of Hindu fundamentalist organisations associated 
with the BJP, marched to the Ganges River where they destroyed the set. Among the 
participants were members of the RSS, VHP, Shiv Sena and the Kashi Sanskriti Raksha 
Sangharsh Samithi (KSRSS), an amalgam of several Hindu fundamentalist organisations. 
After wrecking the film set, the mob held a meeting and vowed to stop the film. Police 
officers made no attempt to arrest any of those responsible. 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/feb2000/film-f12.shtml (accessed on 15th November 
2006). For further details on Fire see Ratna Kapur. “Too Hot to Handle.” Feminist Review 64 
(Spring, 2000): 53-64 and on Water see Edwina Mason. “The Water Controversy and the 
Politics of Hindu Nationalism.” Hindu Nationalism and Governance. Eds. John McGuire and 
Ian Copland. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2007. 303 – 315. 
 - 27 -
                                                                                                                                                  
16 The demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya, supposedly the birthplace of the mythic 
god Ram, was a rallying point for all Hindu nationalists and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP) who had launched a movement in 1984, The Ram Janmabhoomi – Babri Masjid for 
the building of a temple to the mythic god Ram on the site of this mosque. In a dubious re-
writing of history by the Hindu Right, it was allegedly the original site of a temple that had 
been destroyed by a marauding Muslim ruler Babur who invaded the Indian subcontinent in 
the 16th century. This movement gathered momentum in the 1990s and formed an integral 
part of the BJP/NDA electoral manifesto. 
17 From all accounts it was widely believed that the director Mani Ratnam made a deal with 
Bal Thackeray to cut a scene lasting nearly four minutes of an incendiary speech by him. See 
Gopalan. 
18 Supreme Court ruled on March 30, 1989 in S. Rangarajan vs V P Jagjeevan Ram: “If the 
film is objectionable and cannot constitutionally be restricted under Article 19 (2), freedom of 
expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or 
threats of violence…The state cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience 
problem. It is its obligatory duty to present it and protect the freedom of expression.” 
(Noorani  240) 
19 According to the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) website on film 
classification, the “U” certification is defined as “Unrestricted Public Exhibition.” 
20 Letter from Regional Officer in Bombay, A. Ramakrishnan (RO) to Pradeep Gaur, Desk 
Officer, Information & Broadcasting Ministry, [CBFC File No. M/33/95 (part file: Complaint 
on film Bombay), dated 24th April 1995]  
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21 The State had historically kept documentary filmmaking under tight control through the 
establishment of the Film Advisory Board (FAB) in 1940, the first instance of direct State 
production of documentary film in India. Started as part of the Department of Information to 
advise on the making of propaganda shorts during the Second World War, FAB was intended 
to collaborate with independent producers/financiers, co-ordinating and overseeing the 
distribution of indigenous and imported war propaganda films. In 1949, the Films Division 
(FD) was established, a ‘mass – media’ unit run by the Ministry of Information & 
Broadcasting, it is the central film producing organisation responsible for the production and 
distribution of newsreels, documentaries and other films required by the Government of India 
for public information, education and for instructional and cultural purposes. Until the post-
Emergency period in 1975, which saw the independently made documentary, the FD had 
monopoly on documentary cinema in India which were exhibited through compulsory block 
booking in every permanent cinema in the country. The bulk of the FD’s enormous output is 
by in-house filmmakers. (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 95 & 96).  
 
22 The Godhra riots refer to the massacre of Muslims in the BJP-administered state of Gujarat 
in 2002. The extremist right-wing youth group, Bajrang Dal had been accused by the 
international Human Rights Watch and the Indian Human Rights Commission of direct 
involvement in the killings (See Sen 52). 
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